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Abstract
Background knowledge is an important factor in privacy
preserving data publishing. Distribution-based background
knowledge is one of the well studied background knowledge.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no existing
work considering the distribution-based background knowl-
edge in the worst case scenario, by which we mean that the
adversary has accurate knowledge about the distribution of
sensitive values according to some tuple attributes. Con-
sidering this worst case scenario is essential because we
cannot overlook any breaching possibility. In this paper,
we propose an algorithm to anonymize dataset in order to
protect individual privacy by considering this background
knowledge. We prove that the anonymized datasets gener-
ated by our proposed algorithm protects individual privacy.
Our empirical studies show that our method preserves high
utility for the published data at the same time.
1 Introduction
Privacy preserving data publishing is an important topic
in the literature of privacy for very pragmatic reasons. As
an example, AOL did not take sufficient precaution and en-
countered some undesired consequences. A dataset about
search logs was published in 2006. Later AOL realized that
a single 62 year old woman living in Georgia can be re-
identified from the search logs by some New York Times
reporters. The search logs were withdrawn and two em-
ployees responsible for releasing the search logs were fired
[3].
Example 1 (Data Publishing) Suppose a table T like Ta-
ble 1 is to be anonymized for publication. Table T has two
kinds of attributes, (1) the quasi-identifier (QI) attributes
and (2) the sensitive attribute. (1) The QI attributes can be
used as an identifier in the table. In our example, the QI at-
tributes are Nationality and Zipcode. Attribute Name is just
for discussion and is not used for publication. [17] points
out that in a real dataset, about 87% of individuals can be
uniquely identified by some QI attributes with a publicly
available external table such as a voter registration list1. An
example of a voter registration list is shown in Table 2. (2)
The sensitive attribute contains some sensitive values. In
our example, the sensitive attribute is “Disease” containing
sensitive values such as Heart Disease and HIV. Assume
that each tuple in the table is owned by an individual and
each individual owns at most one tuple.
Our target is to anonymize T and publish the
anonymized dataset T ∗ like Table 3 to satisfy some pri-
vacy requirements. A typical anonymization is described
as follows. T is horizontally partitioned into multiple tuple
groups. Let P be a resulting group. We give a unique ID
called GID to P and all tuples in P are said to have the same
GID value. An anonymization defines a function β on each
P to form an anonymized group (in short, A-group) such
that the linkage between the QI attributes and the sensitive
attribute in the A-group is broken. One way to break the
linkage is bucketization, forming two tables, called the QI
table (Table 3(a)) and the sensitive table (Table 3(b)): P is
projected on all QI attributes and attribute GID to form the
QI table, and on the sensitive attribute and attribute GID to
form the sensitive table. Therefore, a table T is anonymized
to a dataset T ∗ if T ∗ is formed by first partitioning T into
a number of groups, then forming an A-group from each
partition by β and finally inserting each A-group into T ∗.
1There are many sources of such an external table. Most municipali-
ties sell population registers that include the identifiers of individuals along
with basic demographics; examples include local census data, voter lists,
city directories, and information from motor vehicle agencies, tax asses-
sors, and real estate agencies [15]. From [17], it is reported that a city’s
voter list in two diskettes was purchased for twenty dollars, and was used
to re-identify medical records.
Name Nationality Zipcode Disease
Alex American 55501 Heart Disease
Bob Japanese 55502 Flu
Japanese 55503 Flu
Japanese 55504 Stomach Virus
French 66601 HIV
Japanese 66601 Diabetes
... ... ...
Table 1. An example
Name Nationality Zipcode
Alex American 55501
Bob Japanese 55502
Chris Japanese 55503
David Japanese 55504
Emily French 66601
Fred Japanese 66601
... ... ...
Table 2. Voter reg-
istration list
Nationality Zipcode GID
American 55501 L1
Japanese 55502 L1
Japanese 55503 L2
Japanese 55504 L2
French 66601 L3
Japanese 66601 L3
... ... ...
GID Disease
L1 Heart Disease
L1 Flu
L2 Flu
L2 Stomach Virus
L3 HIV
L3 Diabetes
... ...
(a) QI Table (b) Sensitive table
Table 3. A 2-diverse dataset
anonymized from Table 1
For example, Table 1 is anonymized to Table 3 by bucketi-
zation. Such an anonymization is commonly adopted in the
literature of data publishing [20, 21, 14, 18, 10].
There are many privacy models in the literature such as
k-anonymity [17], l-diversity [13], t-closeness [9], (k, e)-
anonymity [21], Injector [10] and m-confidentiality [18].
For illustration, let us consider a simplified setting of the l-
diversity model [13] as a privacy requirement for published
data T ∗. An A-group is said to be l-diverse or satisfy l-
diversity if in the A-group the number of occurrences of
any sensitive value is at most 1/l of the group size. A ta-
ble satisfies l-diversity (or it is l-diverse) if all A-groups in
it are l-diverse. Suppose that Table 1 is anonymized to Ta-
ble 3. Consider the A-group with GID equal to L1 which
corresponds to the first two tuples in QI table (Table 3(a))
and the first two tuples in sensitive table (Table 3(b)). In
the following, we simply refer to the A-group with GID
equal to Li by Li. Since L1 contains two tuples, the group
size of L1 is equal to 2. Since the number of occurrences
of any sensitive value (i.e., 1) is at most 1/2 of the group
size, L1 satisfies 2-diversity. Similarly, L2 and L3 satisfy
2-diversity. Thus, Table 3 satisfies 2-diversity. The inten-
tion of 2-diversity is that each individual cannot be linked
to a disease with a probability of more than 0.5 without any
additional background knowledge.
However, this table does not protect individual privacy
sufficiently if we consider background knowledge.
Example 2 (Background Knowledge) Consider L1 in Ta-
ble 3. In L1, Heart Disease and Flu are values of the sen-
sitive attribute Disease. Since most individuals can be re-
identified by the QI attributes with a publicly available ex-
ternal table such as voter registration list [17], if we are
given the voter registration list as shown in Table 2, it is
easy to figure out that the two tuples in L1 correspond to
Alex and Bob. From L1, it seems that each of the two indi-
viduals, Alex and Bob, in this group has a 50% chance of
linking to Heart Disease (Flu). The reason why the chance
is interpreted as 50% is that the analysis is based on this
group without any additional information.
Suppose we are given a probability distribution as shown
in Table 4. The distribution of attribute set {“Nationality”}
consists of the probabilities that a Japanese, an American or
a French is linked to “Heart Disease” (and “Not Heart Dis-
ease”). For example, the probability that American is linked
to Heart Disease is 0.1 and the probability that Japanese
is linked to Heart Disease is 0.003. With this distribution,
the adversary can say that Bob, being a Japanese, has less
chance of having Heart Disease. S/he can deduce that Alex,
being an American, has a higher chance of having Heart
Disease. The intended 50% threshold is thus violated.
Hence background knowledge has important impact on
privacy preserving data publishing. Recent works [9, 12, 14,
6, 18] start to focus on modeling background knowledge.
Distribution-based background knowledge is one type of
the well-known background knowledge which is used in the
state-of-the-art privacy model, t-closeness. Distribution-
based background knowledge [9, 12] is the information re-
lated to the distribution about sensitive information in data.
There are at least two kinds of distribution-based back-
ground knowledge, namely dataset based distribution and
QI based distribution. The dataset based distribution is the
distribution of the values in the sensitive attribute according
to the entire dataset [9]. The QI based distribution is the
distribution of the values in the sensitive attribute restricted
to individuals with the same values on some QI attributes
[12].
Example 3 (Distribution-based background knowledge)
Suppose that there are 100,000 individuals in the dataset T
and with 6,000 individuals linking to “Heart Disease”. The
probability that an individual t in the dataset is linked to
“Heart Disease” is 0.06. The dataset based distribution has
been considered by [9].
In this paper we consider QI based distribution [12].
Some well-known examples of such knowledge are the facts
that Japanese seldom suffer from Heart Disease [13] and
male individual cannot be linked to ovarian cancer [10]. For
example, the distribution of the sensitive attribute according
to Japanese may be encoded as {(Japanese:“Heart Disease”,
0.003), (Japanese:“Flu”, 0.21), ...} where (Japanese:x, p)
denotes that the probability that a Japanese is linked to a
value x is p.
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p() Heart Disease Not Heart Disease
American 0.1 0.9
Japanese 0.003 0.997
French 0.05 0.95
Table 4. A QI based distribution of attribute
“Nationality” for our motivating example
If the QI based background knowledge is accurate, we
say that we have the worse case scenario. Considering the
worst-case scenario is essential in data publishing [14, 6,
18] because it gives the maximal protection [11]. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no existing work considering the
worst-case QI based distribution.
There is only one work [12] closely related to ours. How-
ever, [12] considers the QI based distribution background
knowledge with uncertainty. Specifically, in [12], the un-
certainty of the background knowledge is denoted by an
input parameter B. Conceptually, if B is equal to 0, then
the adversary has the clearest understanding about back-
ground knowledge which corresponds to the worst-case
background knowledge. However, if B is set to 0 in the
model proposed by [12], then the background knowledge
is undefined. Also [12] adopts a brute force approach in
the anonymization by checking the breaching probability
of anonymzied groups. There are two disadvantages on this
approach. The first problem is that the breaching probability
is hard to compute and therefore approximation is needed in
their method, which sacrifices the correctness. The second
problem is that the breaching probability is not monotone in
that an A-group that violates privacy may be split into two
groups that preserve privacy. Therefore, even though Mon-
drian [8] is adopted as their algorithm, it does not guarantee
an optimal solution in spite of the effort in exhaustive search
in each iteration in the top-down processing. Our solution
will overcome both of these problems.
Building on previous works, we propose a new method
to handle the worse case background knowledge. The
essence of our method is the following. We observe that
privacy is breached whenever an individual in an A-group
has a much higher chance of linking to a sensitive value
compared with another individual in the A-group accord-
ing to the QI based distribution. Based on this observation,
we propose a solution which generates a dataset such that
all individuals in each A-group have “similar” chances of
linking to any sensitive value in the group, according to the
distribution. For example if we form a group with an Amer-
icans and a Canadian, linking to heart disease and flu, and
suppose the probabilities of Americans and Canadians be-
ing linked to heart disease and to flu are similar. Since they
have “similar” chances, it is not possible for the adversary
to pinpoint any linkage of an individual to a sensitive value
with a higher chance. At the same time, our methods can
maintain high utility for the published table.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows. Firstly,
to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to handle the
worst-case QI based distribution. Secondly, we derive an
interesting and useful theoretical property and based on this
property, we propose an algorithm which generates a dataset
protecting individual privacy in the presence of the worst-
case QI based distribution. Finally, we have conducted ex-
periments which shows that our proposed algorithm is effi-
cient and incurs low information loss.
2 Problem Definition
Let T be a table. We assume that one of the attributes is
a sensitive attribute X where some values of this attribute
should not be linkable to any individual. These values are
called sensitive values. The value of the sensitive attribute
of a tuple t is denoted by t.X . A quasi-identifier (QI) is
a set of attributes of T , A1, A2, ..., Aq , that may serve as
identifiers for some individuals. Each tuple in the table T
is related to one individual and no two tuples are related to
the same individual. With publicly available voter registra-
tion lists (like Table 2), the QI values can often be used to
identify a unique individual [17, 18].
There are two common approaches for anonymization,
which generates T ∗ from T . One is generalization by gen-
eralizing all QI values in each A-group to the same value.
The other is bucketization, which we have illustrated in the
previous section. For the ease of illustration, we focus on
bucketization. The discussion for generalization is similar.
With anonymization, there is a mapping which maps each
tuple in T to an A-group in T ∗. For example, the first tuple
t1 in Table 1 is mapped to A-group L1.
The aim of privacy preserving data publishing is to deter
any attack from the adversary on linking an individual to
a certain sensitive value. Specifically, the data publisher
would try to limit the probability of such a linkage that can
be established.
In the literature [20, 18, 10, 9], it is assumed that
the knowledge of an adversary includes (1) the published
dataset T ∗, (2) a publicly available external table T e such as
a voter registration list that maps QIs to individuals [17, 18]
and (3) some background knowledge. We also follow these
assumptions in our analysis. We focus on the QI based dis-
tribution as background knowledge.
The QI based distribution for the attribute set
{“Nationality”} is described in Table 4. Each probability in
the table is called a global probability. The sample space
for each such discrete probability distribution consists of the
possible assignments of the sensitive values such as x to an
individual with the particular nationality. For nationality s,
the sample space is denoted by Ωs.
Each possible value in attribute “Nationality” in our
example is called a signature. There are three possible
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signatures in our example: “Japanese”, “American” and
“French”. In general, there can be other attribute sets,
such as {“Nationality”, “Zipcode”}, with their correspond-
ing QI-based distributions. We define the signature and the
QI-based distribution for a particular attribute set A as fol-
lows.
Given a QI attribute set A with q attributes A1, ..., Aq .
A signature s of A is a set of attribute-value pairs
(A1, v1), ..., (Aq, vq) which appear in the published dataset
T ∗, where Ai is a QI attribute and vi is a value. A tuple t
in T ∗ is said to match s if t.Ai = vi for all i = 1, 2, ..., q.
For example, a signature s can be {(“Nationality”, “Amer-
ican”), (“Zipcode”, “55501”)} if the attribute set A is
{“Nationality”, “Zipcode”}. For convenience, we often
drop the attribute names, and thus we have {“American”,
“55501”} for the above signature. The first tuple in Ta-
ble 3(a) matches {“American”} but the second does not.
Given an attribute set A, the QI-based distribution G of
A contains a set of entries (s : x, p) for each possible sig-
nature s of A, where p is equal to p(s : x) which denotes
the probability that a tuple matching signature s is linked
to x. For example, G may contain (“Japanese”:“Heart Dis-
ease”, 0.003) and (“American”:“Heart Disease”, 0.1). This
involves two sample spaces ΩJapanese and ΩAmerican.
Definition 1 (r-robustness) Given the QI-based distribu-
tion, a dataset T ∗ is said to satisfy r-robustness (or T ∗ is
r-robust) if, for any individual t and any sensitive value x,
the probability that t is linked to x, p(t : x), does not exceed
1/r.
We will discuss about the sample space for p(t : x) and
derive a formula for p(t : x) in Section 3. In this paper, we
are studying the following problem: given a dataset T , gen-
erate an anonymized dataset T ∗ from T which satisfies r-
robustness and at the same time minimizing the information
loss. There have been different definitions for information
loss in the literature. In our experiments, we shall adopt the
measurement of accuracy in query results from T ∗ versus
that from T .
3 Probability Formulation
For the sake of illustration, in this section, we consider a
certain attribute set A and a sensitive value x. We will con-
sider any attribute set and any sensitive value in Section 4.
Suppose there are m possible signatures for attribute set
A, namely s1, s2, ..., sm. Let G be the background knowl-
edge consisting of the set of all QI based distributions. In
G, the probability that si is linked to a sensitive value x is
given by p(si : x).
Given G, the formula for p(t : x), the probability that a
tuple t is linked to sensitive value x, is derived below.
In the following, we consider the anonymized dataset
T ∗. Suppose t belongs to A-group Lk in T ∗. For the ease
Lk an A-group (anonymized group) in the
anonymized dataset
A set of attributes e.g. {“Nationality”, “Zipcode”}
t1, ..., tN tuples in an A-group
s1, ..., sm signatures for A, e.g.{“American”, “55501”}
multiple tuples tj’s can map to the same si
x, y sensitive values
p(tj : x) probability that tuple tj is linked to value x
p(si : x) probability that signature si is linked to x
fi a simplified notation for p(si : x)
w a possible world: an assignment of the tuples
in A-group Lk to the sensitive values in Lk
Wk set of all possible worlds w for Lk
W
(tj :x)
k set of all possible worlds w in Wk
in which tj is assigned value x
p(w|Lk) probability that w occurs given A-group Lk
pj,w the probability that tj is linked to a value in the
sensitive attribute as specified in w
Table 6. Notations
of reference, let us summarize the notations that we use in
Table 6. We shall need the following definitions.
Definition 2 (Possible World) Consider an A-group Lk
with N tuples, namely t1, t2, ..., tN , with corresponding
values in sensitive attribute X of γ1, γ2, ...γN . A possible
world w for Lk is a possible assignment mapping the tuples
in set {t1, t2, ..., tN} to values in multi-set {γ1, γ2, ...γN}
in Lk.
Given an A-group Lk with a set of tuples and a multi-
set of the values in X . Considering all possible worlds, we
form a sample space. More precisely, the sample space
Ωw|Lk consists of all the possible assignments of the sen-
sitive values in Lk to the N tuples in Lk. For each such
possible world w, according to the QI based distribution G
based on attribute set A, we can determine the probability
p(w|Lk) that w occurs given Lk.
Definition 3 (Primitive Events, Projected Events) A
mapping t : x from an individual or tuple t to a value x
in the set of sensitive attributes is called a primitive event.
Suppose t matches signature s. Let us call an event for the
corresponding signature, “s : x”, a projected event for t.
Note that this projected event belongs to sample space Ωs.
A primitive event is an event in the sample space Ωw|Lk .
The probability of such an event, p(t : x), is the proba-
bility of interest for the adversary. The probability of the
projected event, p(s : x), is in the QI based distribution G.
Similar to [13, 20, 18], we assume that the linkage of a
value in X to an individual is independent of the linkage of
a value in X to another individual. For example, whether
an American suffers from Heart Disease is independent of
whether a Japanese suffers from Heart Disease. Thus, for a
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p() x y
s1 0.5 0.5
s2 0.2 0.8
w t1 t2 t3 t4 p(w) p(w|Lk)
(s1) (s1) (s2) (s2)
w1 x x y y 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.8 × 0.8 = 0.16 0.16/0.33 = 0.48
w2 x y x y 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.2 × 0.8 = 0.04 0.04/0.33 = 0.12
w3 x y y x 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.8 × 0.2 = 0.04 0.04/0.33 = 0.12
w4 y x x y 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.2 × 0.8 = 0.04 0.04/0.33 = 0.12
w5 y x y x 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.8 × 0.2 = 0.04 0.04/0.33 = 0.12
w6 y y x x 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.2 × 0.2 = 0.01 0.01/0.33 = 0.03
(a) conditional distribution (b) p(w) and p(w|Lk)
Table 5. An example illustrating the computation of p(tj : x)
possible world w for Lk, the probability that w occurs given
Lk is proportional to the product of the probabilities of the
corresponding projected events for the tuples t1, ...tN inLk,
we shall denote this product as p(w):
p(w) = p1,w × p2,w × ...× pN,w (1)
where pj,w is the probability that tj is linked to a value
in the sensitive attribute specified in w. Suppose tj matches
signature si. If tj is linked to x in w, then pj,w = p(si : x).
Let the set of all the possible worlds for Lk be Wk. The
sum of probabilities of all the possible worlds given Lk
must be 1, since they form the sample space Ωw|Lk . Hence,
the probability of w given Lk is given by:
For w ∈ Wk, we have
p(w|Lk) =
p(w)
∑
w′∈Wk
p(w′)
(2)
Our objective is to find the probability that an individual
tj in Lk is linked to a sensitive value x. This is given by the
sum of the probabilities p(w|Lk) of all the possible worlds
w where tj is linked to x.
p(tj : x) =
∑
w∈W
(tj :x)
k
p(w|Lk) (3)
where W(tj :x)k is a set of all possible worlds w in Wk in
which tj is assigned value x.
Example 4 Consider an A-group Lk in a published table
T ∗. Suppose there are four tuples, t1, t2, t3 and t4, with the
X values of x, x, y, y in Lk. Suppose the published table
T ∗ satisfies 2-diversity.
Consider the QI based distribution G based on a certain
QI attribute set A which contains two possible signatures
s1 and s2. Table 5(a) shows the four global probabilities,
namely p(s1 : x) = 0.5, p(s1 : y) = 0.5, p(s2 : x) =
0.2, p(s2, y) = 0.8.
Suppose t1, t2, t3 and t4 match signatures s1, s1, s2 and
s2, respectively. There are six possible worlds w as shown
in Table 5(b). For example, the first row is the possible
world w1 with mapping {t1 : x, t2 : x, t3 : y, t4 : y}.
The table also shows the values p(w) of the possible worlds.
Take the first possible worldw1 for illustration. From the QI
based distribution in Table 5(a), p(s1 : x) = 0.5 and p(s2 :
y) = 0.8. Hence, p(w1) = 0.5×0.5×0.8×0.8 = 0.16. The
sum of p(w) of all possible worlds from Table 5(b) is equal
to 0.16 + 0.04 + 0.04 + 0.04 + 0.04 + 0.01 = 0.33. Consider
w1 again. Since p(w1) = 0.16, p(w1|Lk) = 0.16/0.33 =
0.48.
Suppose the adversary is interested in the probability that
t1 is linked to x. We obtain p(t1 : x) as follows. w1, w2 and
w3, as shown in Table 5(b), contain “t1 : x”. Thus, p(t1 : x)
is equal to the sum of the probabilities p(w1|Lk), p(w2|Lk)
and p(w3|Lk). p(t1 : x) = 0.48+0.12+0.12 = 0.72. Note
that this is greater than 0.5, the intended upper bound for 2-
diversity that an individual is linked to a sensitive value.
4 Algorithm for Data Publishing
Given the formulation of p(t : x), a naive approach
for r-robustness is to adopt some known anonymization
algorithm A and replace the probability measure in A by
p(t : x). However, the complexity of computing p(t : x) is
very high given the exponential number of possible worlds.
Moreover, r-robustness is not monotone in the sense that an
A-group that violates r-robustness may be split into small
groups that are r-robust, while known top-down algorithms
are based on monotone privacy conditions.
This section presents an algorithm for generating an r-
robust table that overcome the above problems. Section 4.1
first presents an important theoretical property for this prob-
lem. Section 4.2 then describes our proposed algorithm,
ART.
4.1 Theoretical Property
In Section 1, we observe that privacy is breached easily
whenever an individual in an A-group has a much higher
chance of linking to a sensitive value compared with an-
other individual in the A-group. For example, consider
the A-group L1 in Table 3. From the QI-based distribu-
tion (Table 4), it is more likely that American is linked to
Heart Disease compared with Japanese, we can deduce that
Alex, an American, has Heart Disease with higher proba-
bility. Note that the global probability of American link-
ing to Heart Disease, denoted by f1, is 0.1 and the global
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probability of Japanese linking to Heart Disease, denoted
by f2, is 0.003. The difference in the global probabilities
is 0.1 − 0.003 = 0.097. Since the A-group size is small,
the difference gives some information to aid privacy breach.
The difference in the global probabilities and the A-group
size are the properties of the A-group.
In the following, we have a theorem on the relationship
between the privacy guarantee and the properties of an A-
group L. Consider a tuple tv in an A-group L. We want
to show that, if the properties of L satisfy some conditions,
the privacy of tv can be guaranteed (i.e., p(tv : x) ≤ 1/r).
The conditions essentially limits the deviations in the global
probabilities in terms of the group size.
In the following we consider the QI based distribution G
on a certain attribute set A. The algorithm to be described
later will consider multiple attribute sets.
Definition 4 (Greatest Probability Deviation△) Let L
be an A-group in T ∗ with tuples t1, t2, ...tN where N is
the group size and N ≥ r. Let x be a sensitive value that
appears once in L. Without loss of generality, suppose
tuple tv matches signature sv , v ∈ [1, N ]. Thus, tuple tv
has the QI based probability (or global probability) linking
to x in L equal to p(sv : x) = fv.
Let fmax be the greatest global probabilities in L (i.e.,
fmax = maxv∈[1,N ] fv). The probability deviation of tv
given fmax is △v = fmax − fv, v ∈ [1, N ].
Let us give some examples to illustrate the above nota-
tions. In our running example of L1, the group size N is
equal to 2. In L1, the first tuple (Alex) is t1 and the sec-
ond tuple (Bob) is t2. Let s1 = {“American”} and s2 =
{“Japanese”}. Thus, f1 = 0.1 and f2 = 0.003. We know
that t1 matches s1 and t2 matches s2. Since fmax is the
greatest global probabilities in L, fmax is equal to 0.1 (be-
cause f1 = 0.1 and f2 = 0.003). Thus,△1 = fmax− f1 =
0.1−0.1 = 0 and△2 = fmax−f2 = 0.1−0.003 = 0.097.
Theorem 1 Let r be the privacy parameter in r-robustness
where r > 1. Following the symbols in Definition 4, if for
all v ∈ [1, N ],
△v ≤
(N − r)fmax
fmax(r − 1)/(1− fmax) + (N − 1)
(4)
then for all v ∈ [1, N ], p(tv : x) ≤ 1/r
Proof: The proof is given in the appendix.
Definition 5 (△, △max) △max is defined to be the R.H.S.
of Inequality (4). That is,
△max =
(N − r)fmax
fmax(r − 1)/(1− fmax) + (N − 1)
Define △ = maxv∈[1,N ]{△v}
N r fmax △max
3 2 0.1 0.0474
3 2 0.3 0.1235
3 2 0.5 0.1667
3 2 0.9 0.0818
4 2 0.3 0.1750
6 2 0.3 0.2211
6 3 0.3 0.1537
6 4 0.3 0.0955
Table 7. Values of △max with some chosen
values of N, r and fmax
Hence, △ is the greatest difference in the global proba-
bilities linking to x in an A-group. Note that △ ≥ 0. In our
running example, since △1 = 0 and △2 = 0.097, we have
△ = max{0, 0.097} = 0.097.
Consider another example. If an A-group L contains
three tuples matching s1, s2 and s3 with the global prob-
abilities f1 = 0.1, f2 = 0.08 and f3 = 0.09. Then, N = 3
and fmax = 0.1. △ = 0.1− 0.08 = 0.02. Suppose r = 2.
The R.H.S. of (4) is △max = (3 − 2) × 0.1/[0.1 × (2 −
1)/(1− 0.1)+ (3− 1)] = 0.0474. Since△ < 0.0474, from
Theorem 1, for all tuples tv in L, p(tv : x) ≤ 1/r where
r = 2.
Let us consider the effects of the values of fmax and
N to understand the physical meaning of Theorem 1. If
fmax = 1 or fmax = 0, then △ ≤ 0. Hence, the QI based
distributions of all tuples in L should be the same to guar-
antee privacy.
Table 7 shows the values of △max with some chosen
values of N, r and f . It can be seen that △max is small
when f is near the extreme values of 0 or 1, since the global
probability of a tuple is more pronounced.
Consider Inequality (4). If N → ∞, then △ ≤ fmax.
Since fmax is the greatest possible global probability in L,
it means that △ can be any feasible value (i.e., 0 ≤ △ ≤
fmax). Therefore, when the A-group is extremely large,
under Theorem 1, there will be no privacy breach. When
N = r, △ ≤ 0. That is, the global probabilities of all
tuples in L should be equal. Otherwise, there may be a
privacy breach. Furthermore, N has the following relation
with △max.
Lemma 1 △max is a monotonic increasing function on N .
Proof:Let f = fmax, d△maxdN =
(r−1)× f
2
1−f +(r−1)×f
[(r−1)× f1−f +(N−1)]
2
≥ 0
From the above, in order to guarantee p(tv : x) ≤ 1/r,
we can increase the size N of the A-groupL. With a greater
value of N , the upper bound △max increases, and the con-
straint as dictated by Inequality (4) is relaxed, making it
easier to reach the guarantee.
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4.2 Algorithm ART
Based on Theorem 1, we propose an Algorithm generat-
ing r-Robust Table called ART. If an A-groupL satisfies the
inequality in Theorem 1 with respect to attribute set A and,
inL, each sensitive value occurs at most once, we say thatL
satisfies the QI based distribution bound condition with re-
spect to A. Otherwise, L violates the QI based distribution
bound condition.
In the algorithm, initially, each individual forms an inde-
pendent A-group. The algorithm repeatedly looks for any
A-group such that there exists an attribute set A where it
violates the QI based distribution bound condition with re-
spect to A. Such a group is merged with other existing
groups so that the resulting group satisfies the condition.
After merging, the number of tuples in L, N , is increased.
Then, by Lemma 1, △max is also increased. The constraint
by Inequality (4) is relaxed and it is more likely to satisfy
the QI based distribution bound condition. When a final so-
lution is reached, each individual is linked to any sensitive
value with probability at most 1/r.
Specifically, algorithm ART involves two major steps.
• Step 1 (Individual A-group Formation): For each tuple
t in the table T , we form an A-group L containing t
only.
• Step 2 (Merging): For each sensitive value x, while
there exists an A-group L and an attribute set A such
that L violates the QI based distribution bound condi-
tion with respect to A, we find a set L of A-groups
such that, after merging all A-groups in L with L,
the merged A-group satisfies the QI based distribution
bound condition with respect to any attribute set A.
The idea of Step 2 is to keep the △ value in L with re-
spect to A unchanged or only slightly increased after merg-
ing. At the same time, we also make sure that each merged
A-group contains at most one x for any sensitive value x.
Before going into the details of Step 2, we need to define
a new term. Given an A-group L, another A-group L′ is
called a closest A-group with respect to L if, after merging
L′ and L, the increase in the value of△ with respect to any
attribute set is the smallest among all possible A-groups.
Definition 6 (Closest A-group) Suppose△before,A repre-
sents △ with respect to an attribute set A in L and
△after,A(L,L
′) represents △ with respect to an attribute
set A in the A-group obtained by merging L and L′.
Let DA(L,L′) = △after,A(L,L′)−△before,A.
Let D(L,L′) =
∑
ADA(L,L
′).
L′ is a closest A-group with respect to L if D(L,L′) =
minL′′{D(L,L
′′)}.
We are ready to describe Step 2 in details. Let Y (L) be
the set of sensitive values which appear in an A-group L.
Given an A-group, it is easy to derive △ and fmax. Note
that r is a user parameter. After we know △, fmax and r,
we can derive the expected minimum size of L based on the
QI based distribution bound condition with respect to A,
denoted by No. By replacing N with No and changing the
subject of Inequality (4) in the QI based distribution condi-
tion to No, we have
No ≥
(fmax(r − 1)△)/(1− fmax)−△+ rfmax
(fmax −△)
(5)
Let us choose a smallest integer N ′o such that the above in-
equality holds. We calculate N ′o for every attribute set A
and choose the greatest values of N ′o as our final N ′o. If
the total number of tuples in L, N , is smaller than N ′o, then
we have to choose additional N ′o − N tuples to be merged
with L. We choose a closest A-group L′ with respect to L
where L′ does not contain any sensitive value in Y (L). L′
is merged with L, and △, f and N ′o are updated accord-
ingly. If the updated N value is still smaller than N ′o, then
we repeatedly continue the above process.
Theorem 2 Any table T ∗ generated by Algorithm ART is
r-robust.
5 Empirical Study
A Pentium IV 2.2GHz PC with 1GB RAM was used to
conduct our experiment. The algorithm was implemented
in C/C++. We adopted the publicly available dataset, Adult
Database, from the UCIrvine Machine Learning Repository
[4]. This dataset (5.5MB) was also adopted by [13, 18]. We
used a configuration similar to [13, 18]. The records with
unknown values were first eliminated resulting in a dataset
with 45,222 tuples (5.4MB). Nine attributes were chosen
in our experiment, namely Age, Work Class, Marital Sta-
tus, Occupation, Race, Sex, Native Country, Salary Class
and Education. By default, we chose the first five attributes
and the last attribute as the quasi-identifer and the sensitive
attribute, respectively. Similar to [18], in attribute “Edu-
cation”, all values representing the education levels before
“secondary” (or “9th-10th”) such as “1st-4th”, “5th-6th”
and “7th-8th” are regarded as a sensitive value set where an
adversary checks whether each individual is linked to this
set more than 1/r, where r is a parameter.
There are 3.46% tuples with education levels before
“secondary”. Since there is a set G of multiple QI based
distributions G, we can calculate p(t : x) for different G’s
and different x’s. We take the greatest such value to report
as the probability that individual t is linked to some sensi-
tive value since this corresponds to the worst case privacy
breach.
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We compared our proposed algorithm ART with four al-
gorithms, Anatomy [20], MASK [18], Injector [10] and t-
closeness [9]. They are selected because they consider l-
diversity or similar privacy requirements, so we need only
set l = r. We are interested to know the overhead required
in our approach in order to achieve r-robustness. When we
compared ART with Anatomy, we set l = r. When we
compared it with MASK, the parameters k and m used in
MASK are set to r. For Injector, the parametersminConf ,
minExp and l are set to 1, 0.9 and r, respectively, which
are the default settings in [10]. For t-closeness, similar to
[9], we set t = 0.2. We evaluate the algorithms in terms
of four measurements: (1) execution time, (2) relative er-
ror ratio, (3) the proportion of problematic tuples among
all sensitive tuples and (4) the average value of△.
(1) Execution time: We measured the execution time of
algorithms. (2) Relative error ratio: As in [20, 18, 10], we
measure the error by the relative error ratio in answering
an aggregate query. We adopt both the form of the aggre-
gate query and the parameters of the query dimensionality
qd and the expected query selectivity s from [20, 18, 10].
For each evaluation in the case of two anonymized tables,
we performed 10,000 queries and then reported the average
relative error ratio. By default, we set s = 0.05 and qd to be
the QI size. (3) Proportion of problematic tuples among all
sensitive tuples: According to the probability formulation
in Section 3, according to the anonymized table generated
by all algorithms, we can calculate the probability that a tu-
ple is linked to a sensitive value set. If the tuple has the
probability > 1/r, it is said to be a problematic tuple. The
tuples linking to sensitive values in the original table are
called sensitive tuples. In our experiments, we measure the
proportion of problematic tuples among all sensitive tuples.
(4) Average value of △: More formally, the average value
of △ is evaluated with respect to every attribute set A con-
taining large samples. Consider a sensitive value x. With
respect to a certain attribute set A, the average value of △
denoted by HA is equal to 1u
∑
L∈T∗△L, where u is the
total number of A-groups in T ∗ and △L is the greatest dif-
ference in the global probability linking to a sensitive value
x with respect to A in an A-group L. Let B be the set of
all attribute sets A containing large samples. With respect
to every attribute set in B, the average value of △ is equal
to 1|B|
∑
A∈B HA. We perform the same steps for every
sensitive value x and take the average as the reporting aver-
age value of △. For each measurement, we conducted the
experiments 100 times and took the average.
We conducted the experiments by varying four factors:
(1) the QI size, (2) r, (3) query dimensionality qd and (4)
selectivity s.
Figure 1 shows the results when r is set to 10. Figure 1(a)
shows that the execution time increases with the QI size
because the algorithms have to process more QI attributes.
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Figure 1. Effect of QI size (r = 10)
ART performs slower compared with Anatomy, MASK and
t-closeness. Since ART requires to compute the QI based
distribution with respect to every attribute set, when the QI
size increases, the increase in the execution time of ART is
larger.
Figure 1(b) shows that there is an increase in average
relative error when the QI size increases because it is more
difficult to form A-groups where the difference in QI based
distributions among all tuples in an A-group is small when
the QI size is larger. Since t-closeness is a global recoding
and causes a lot of unnecessary generalizations, the average
relative error is the largest. Since Injector tries to exclude
some sensitive values in an A-group, its relative error is also
small.
Figure 1(c) shows that the proportion of problematic tu-
ples among sensitive tuples increases with QI size. With
a larger QI size, there is a higher chance that individual
privacy breaches due to more attributes which can be used
to construct the QI based distributions. MASK has fewer
privacy breaches compared with t-closeness, Anatomy and
Injector because the side-effect of the minimization of QI
values in each A-group adopted in MASK makes the differ-
ence in the QI based distribution among all tuples in each
A-group smaller. Thus, the number of individual with pri-
vacy breaches is smaller. It is noted that there is no violation
in ART.
In Figure 1(d), we include the theoretical bound of△max
from Theorem 1 for comparison. We use the bound of ART
as this theoretical bound because, compared with Anatomy
and Injector, the size of A-groups formed in ART is largest
(which yields the largest bound). Since the average value
of △ of Anatomy and Injector are greater than this bound,
they may have privacy breaches as shown in Figure 1(c).
When the QI size increases, the average value of △ with
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respect to every attribute set increases, as shown in Fig-
ure 1(d). With a larger QI size, during forming an A-group,
we have to consider △ with respect to more attribute sets.
Thus, it is more likely that an A-group has a larger average
value of △ with respect to every attribute set. The average
value of △ is the largest in Anatomy and Injector, and the
next two largest in MASK and t-closeness. This is because
Anatomy and Injector does not take our QI based distribu-
tion directly into the consideration for merging but MASK
and t-closeness do indirectly during the minimization of QI
values. In Figure 1(d), although the average value of △ of
MASK is smaller than the theoretical bound of △, it is pos-
sible to breach privacy as shown in Figure 1(c) because this
evaluation only shows the average value and the actual △
in some A-groups is larger than this bound.
We also conducted experiments when r = 2. For the
sake of space, we did not show the figures. The results are
also similar. But, the execution time and the average relative
error are smaller. Since r is smaller and thus 1/r is larger,
the average value of △ is larger when r = 2.
6 Related Work
With respect to attribute types considered for data
anonymization, there are two branches of studying. The
first branch is anonymization according to the QI attributes.
A typical model is k-anonymity [2]. The other branch is the
consideration of both QI attributes and sensitive attributes.
Some examples are [13], [19], [9], [10] and [5]. In this
paper, we focus on this branch. We want to check whether
the probability that each individual is linked to any sensitive
value is at most a given threshold.
l-diversity [13] proposes a model where l is a positive
integer and each A-group contains l “well-represented” val-
ues in the sensitive attribute. For t-closeness [9], the distri-
bution in each A-group in T ∗ with respect to the sensitive
attribute is roughly equal to the distribution of the entire ta-
ble T ∗.
In the literature, different kinds of background knowl-
edge are considered [13, 14, 18, 12, 7, 10, 1]. [14] con-
siders another background knowledge in form of implica-
tions. [18] discovers that the minimality principle of the
anonymization algorithm can also be used as background
knowledge. [12] proposes to use the kernel estimation
method to mine the background knowledge from the origi-
nal table.
[10] finds that association rules can be mined from the
original table and thus can be used for privacy protection
during anonymization. In [1], the problem of privacy attack
by adversarial association rule mining is investigated. How-
ever, as pointed out in [16], association rules used in [10]
and [1] can contradict the true statistical properties. Also
the solution in [1] is to invalidate the rules, but this will vi-
olate the data mining objectives of data publication.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the worst-case QI based distri-
bution for privacy-preserving data publishing. Then, we de-
rive a theoretical property and propose an algorithm which
generates a dataset protecting individual privacy in the pres-
ence of the worst-case QI based distribution. Finally, we
conducted experiments to show that our proposed algorithm
is efficient and incurs low information loss. For future
work, we plan to investigate how to anonymize the dataset
with other kinds of background knowledge that may be pos-
sessed by the adversary.
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8 Appendix
Here we prove our main theorem. Let us recap a few notations.
p(si : x) probability that signature si is linked to x
fi a simplified notation for p(si : x)
f fmax, maximum fi value among all i’s
Proof of Theorem 1: Let tu be a tuple in L with the greatest
global probability linking to x in L (i.e., for all tuples tv in L,
fu ≥ fv). Besides, f = fu.
Consider the set Wu of possible worlds where “tu : x” occurs.
Let tv be a tuple such that△v = maxa∈[1,N]{△a}. Consider the
set of possible worlds Wv where “tv : x” occurs.
Consider also the set of possible worlds Wa where “ta : x”
occurs for an arbitrary ta where ta 6= tv . We first want to show
that p(Wa) ≥ p(Wv), where p(Wa) is the probability that any
world in Wa occurs.
Lemma 2 For a ∈ [1, N ], p(Wa) ≥ p(Wv).
Proof of Lemma 2: Since△v = maxa∈[1,N]{△a}, fv ≤ fa and
(1− fv) ≥ (1− fa). Hence,
fa(1− fv) ≥ fv(1− fa) (6)
For a world wv ∈ Wv, p(wv) = p1,wv × ...× pN,wv .
For a world wa ∈Wa, p(wa) = p1,wa × ...× pN,wa .
Note that pv,wv = fv and pa,wa = fa.
Since there is only one x occurrence in L, tv is not assigned
with x in any wa ∈ Wa. Let W ′a be a maximal subset of
Wa where tv’s are assigned to distinct X values. ObviouslyP
wa∈W ′a
pv,wa = 1− fv . Hence,
P
wa∈W ′a
(pa,wa × pv,wa) = fa(1− fv) (7)
Similarly, since ta is not assigned with x in any wv ∈ Wv, we
can find a maximal subset W ′v in Wv where tv’s are assigned to
distinct X values. we have
P
wv∈W ′v
pa,wv = 1− fa.
P
wv∈W ′v
pv,wv × pa,wv = fv(1− fa) (8)
From (6), (7), and (8),
P
wa∈W ′a
pa,wa × pv,wa ≥
P
wv∈W ′v
pv,wv × pa,wv (9)
For each wa ∈ W ′a we can find a unique wv in W ′v , so that fv
in wa and fa in Wv are assigned the same sensitive value.We say
that wa and wv are matching. Let us further restrict W ′v based on
W ′a in such a way that the matching world wv in W ′v for wa in W ′a
has the same sensitive value assignments for the remaining tuples.
It is obvious that we can always form such an W ′v from and any
Wa. For matching wa and wv ,
Q
i6∈{a,v} pi,wa =
Q
i6∈{a,v} pi,wv (10)
Furthermore, Wa can be partitioned into W ′a’s. and the union
of the corresponding W ′v is equal to Wv .
From (9) and (10), we conclude that
P
wa∈Wa
p1,wa × ...× pN,wa ≥
P
wv∈Wv
p1,wv × ...× pN,wv
That is,
P
wa∈Wa
p(wa) ≥
P
wv∈Wv
p(wv).
Therefore, for a ∈ [1, N ],
p(Wa) ≥ p(Wv) (11)
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 If p(tu : x) ≤ 1/r, then p(ta : x) ≤ 1/r for all
a ∈ [1, N ].
Proof of Lemma 3: By similar techniques used in the proof of
Lemma 2, since fu ≥ fa for all a ∈ [1, N ], we derive that
p(Wu) ≥ p(Wa). Let K =
P
w′∈W p(w
′) where W is a set
of all possible worlds. Since p(tu : x) = p(Wu|L) = p(Wu)/K
and p(ta : x) = p(Wa|L) = p(Wa)/K, we have p(tu : x) ≥
p(ta : x). Thus, if p(tu : x) ≤ 1/r, then, for all a ∈ [1, N ],
p(ta : x) ≤ 1/r.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 suggest that, once p(tu : x) is bounded 1/r, all other
probabilities p(ta : x) in the A-group are also bounded. In the
following, we focus on analyzing p(tu : x) only (instead of all
probabilities p(ta : x)).
Consider p(tu : x), which is equal to p(wu|L). Let W be a
set of all possible worlds. Let W(tu:x) be the set of all possible
worlds with “tu : x”. By definition W(tu:x) = Wu and there are
N such sets of worlds inW . Also,
p(Wu|L) =
P
w∈W(tu:x) p(w)P
w∈W p(w)
=
P
w∈W(tu :x) p(w)P
w∈W(tu:x) p(w) +
P
w′∈W/W(tu:x) p(w
′)
=
p(Wu)
p(Wu) +
P
a 6=u p(Wa)
By Lemma 2,
P
a 6=u p(Wa) ≥ (N − 1)p(Wv). Hence,
p(Wu|L) ≤
p(Wu)
p(Wu) + (N − 1)p(Wv)
(12)
From the proof of Lemma 2, Wu and Wv can be par-
titioned into matching pairs of W ′u and W ′v whereP
wu∈W ′u
p(wu) = fu(1 − fv)C for some C and
P
wv∈W ′v
p(wv) = fv(1− fu)C.
Therefore, we can simplify Inequality (12) as follows.
p(wu|L) ≤
fu(1− fv)
fu(1− fv) + (N − 1)× fv(1− fu)
(13)
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Consider the term (N − 1)× fv(1− fu) in Inequality (13)
(N − 1)(1− fu)fv
= (N − 1)(1− f)(f −△v)
= (r − 1)f(1− f +△v)×
(N − 1)(1− f)(f −△v)
(r − 1)f(1− f +△v)
= (r − 1)fu(1− fv)×
(N − 1)(1− f)
(r − 1)f( 1
f−△v
− 1)
After substituting △v ≤ (N − r)f/[ f(r−1)1−f + (N − 1)] into
the above equation, with simple derivations, we obtain
(N − 1)× fv(1− fu) ≥ (r − 1)× fu(1− fv)
With the above inequality, Inequality (13) becomes
p(Wu|L) ≤ 1/r (14)
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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